Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
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Please put your answers to all of the exam’s 10 written questions into one file. Please make sure to do your responses in order, and number them so that we know which question you are answering. Please do NOT include the text of the questions in the file you submit, only the question numbers of the questions as you answer them. Your response should be single-spaced and should require no more than 4-5 pages at maximum. You should need most of the 4 pages to write a good and sufficiently detailed response to each of the questions, but please do not exceed 5 pages total. You should not need to cite any sources other than the lecture materials, the Kernell text, and Blackboard readings. Please do make sure to indicate when you are quoting from any source. Do not use sources other than provided. I have attached some documents and have more to send over. This paper is due Thursday 11/19/2020 by 4pm. Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
Washington University The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States Author(s): John M. Carey, Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell and Gary F. Moncrief Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb., 2006), pp. 105-134 Published by: Washington University Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40263375 Accessed: 27-08-2018 02:36 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Washington University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Legislative Studies Quarterly This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms JOHN M. CAREY Dartmouth College RICHARD G NIEMI University of Rochester LYNDA W.POWELL University of Rochester GARYF.MONCRIEF Boise State University The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States Term limits on legislators were adopted in 21 states during the early 1990s. Beginning in 1996, the limits legally barred incumbents from reelection in 1 1 states, and they will do so in four more by 2010. In 2002, we conducted the only survey of legislators in all 50 states aimed at assessing the impact of term limits on state legislative representation. Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
We found that term limits have virtually no effect on the types of people elected to office – whether measured by a range of demographic characteristics or by ideological predisposition – but they do have measurable impact on certain behaviors and priorities reported by legislators in the survey, and on the balance of power among various institutional actors in the arena of state politics. We characterize the biggest impact on behavior and priorities as a “Burkean shift,” whereby term-limited legislators become less beholden to the constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns. The reform also increases the power of the executive branch (governors and the bureaucracy) over legislative outcomes and weakens the influence of majority party leaders and committee chairs, albeit for different reasons. The imposition of limits on time in office is the most significant innovation in state legislatures since the legislative modernization move- ment of the 1960s and 1970s. Currently, 15 states have term limits, ranging from a lifetime ban on service in a given chamber after as few as six years of service to as much as eight or twelve years with the possibility of endless cycling between chambers.1 Term limits have taken effect in 12 states, beginning in 1996 in California and Maine. Most recently, Oklahoma’s term limits took effect (that is, prevented LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXXI, 1, February 2006 105 This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 106 John M. Carey et al. individuals from running) in November 2004, and 3 mor scheduled to implement their term-limit laws between 20 To date, over 1,300 legislators have been termed out of of Speculation about the overall impact of term limits ac their enactments, but there was little hard evidence on w inferences. Now that legislators have been forced out of offic numbers, empirically based studies have begun to appear. ever, have been limited in generalizability, focusing on jus legislatures (see, for example, Faletta et al. 2000; Farmer, Green 2002, Part I; Rausch 1998; Sarbaugh-Thompson and Tothero 2000). California, one of the first states to intro has been studied in detail (Caress 1996; Caress et al. 2 2002; Daniel and Lott 1 997; Faletta et al. 2000), but in addi only one case, California hampers generalization with its relat ness of having a highly professionalized legislature with p restrictive limitations. Two comprehensive, 50-state studies of term limits h carried out, one devoted to their effects on turnover (Moncri and Powell 2004) and one based on a national survey of s tors in 1995 (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
The latter st on the preliminary effects of term limits based on anticipato in states that had adopted limits early in the decade; the which it relied was conducted before any legislators were actu out of office. By the spring of 2002, with term limits in states, the effects of the reform could be gauged more ap and we undertook a follow-up survey patterned after the one seven years earlier.2 In this article, we report the results of the recent su confirm many of the preliminary findings from the initial st estimate with greater precision and confidence the effect effects – of term limits on various aspects of legislative repr We continue to find little impact on the demographic com legislatures, that is, on the types of people who run for and w office. We find more-pronounced effects, however, on th priorities and behavior of legislators and on the relative powe institutional actors in the legislative arena. Effects of Term Limits: What We Know So Far In our earlier study, we considered three kinds of possible effects of term limits: compositional, behavioral, and institutional. “Compositional effects” refers to legislators’ demographic characteristics, including This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Effects of Term Limits 1 07 their religious and ideological orientations, income sional backgrounds. Early analyses suggested that lead especially to greater numbers of women and min incumbents to be termed out were white males (D Clark 1994; Thompson and Moncrief 1993). With recent studies have found little evidence of this predic term limits create more opportunities for women, th ties unrealized, in part because the number of wom as high as it might have been (Bernstein and Chad Jenkins 2001). For minority groups, some reports limits have had a positive effect, although the effect certain groups in certain states: Latinos in Califo Americans in Michigan (Caress et al. 2003). Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
In our we found almost no evidence of demographic eff basis. We detected a slight tendency toward the electi once term limits were on the books, but the effect w (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). We found no prel term limits on the race, ideology, age, religious or grounds, or socioeconomic status of legislators elected were adopted. “Behavioral effects” refers to the attitudes and pr lators, reflected in part by how legislators allocate on resources: their time. Term-limit advocates have argue encourage legislators to spend less time on activit own reelection and more time on legislative act Wattenberg 1996), a suggestion that found some su work (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). Similarly, have argued that, by severing the electoral con politicians and constituents, term limits alter leg encouraging them to consider broader interests t districts (Will 1992). Some researchers have also su be changes in how legislators interact with each ot 69-70). Little empirical work outside our own h questions. In our earlier survey, however, we found effects. Most tellingly, legislators in states with te equally strong career ambitions. Yet they also we with their personal reputations, more strongly orient interests, and inclined to attribute less importance to c “Institutional effects” refers to the relative influence of various state political actors over policy outcomes. One of the primary arguments of term-limit advocates at the time of adoption was that the reform would energize state legislatures by infusing them with “new This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 108 John M. Carey étal. blood” and new ideas less wedded to the policy statu reducing the risk aversion that the reelection imperat generates (Will 1992). Skeptics held that removing incumbents en masse would weaken state legislatures by enhancing – the informational advantage of the executiv its repository of permanent civil servants, and, for similar advantage of interest groups, whose lobbyists would stick a legislators would come and go (Cohen and Spitzer 1996; Empirical work has mostly supported the skeptics. M Thompson (2001) found that lobbyists in states with term l that the governor, executive agencies, interest groups, staff all have become more influential relative to the legisla and Little (2002) found that legislative leaders in such states that the legislature has lost power relative to other actor most rigorous study to date, Kousser (2005) found that legislatures – and less professionalized ones – are substan than those without limits when bargaining with govern budgets. Kousser also found that legislatures in which term been adopted, but not yet kicked in, experience a burst creativity as longstanding members open the floodgate policy initiatives, but legislative policy innovations then dro limits replace longstanding incumbents with newcomers also note, however, that the effects of lost experience a mitigated by how states have responded to the new reality by instituting new training programs (Peery and Little 2002) leaders in advance of their accession to power (Drage et Methods Survey and Weighting We conducted our new survey in the spring of 2002 as part of a larger, cooperative effort to study term limits. We mailed the four-page survey to every member of both chambers in all 50 states (7,399 individuals). As before, we followed up three times, once with a postcard reminder and twice with new questionnaires and complete instructions.
The response rate was 40%, yielding an N of 2,982. Although we had hoped that sponsorship by three legislative service organizations would boost response rates, even in a time of declining survey response rates in general, the response rate was roughly the same as for our 1995 survey and close to the level of previous studies (Maestas, Neeley, and Richardson 2003, 92).3 This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Effects of Term Limits 1 09 We weighted the data to correct for differenti using the same method we used in 1995. Logistic indicated significant differences in response proba of individual and contextual variables. We used the coefficients from the regression to estimate the probability that individuals with given characteristics responded to the survey. We then weighted respondents by a factor proportionate to the inverse of their response probability. We chose the factor so that the number of respondents in the weighted dataset was the same as that in the unweighted dataset.4 Legislator-Specific versus Chamber-Specific Models To assess the effects of term limits, we compared subsets of legislators. Most obviously, we needed to separate legislators in termlimit (TL) and non-term-limit (NTL) states, but for some purposes it is also important to distinguish legislators on “generational” grounds, or to account for the particulars of a given chamber’s term-limit status. We distinguish here between two broad types of models: legislator-specific models, which classify respondents according to characteristics of individual legislators (for example, the term-limit status of the chamber when the legislator was first elected, or the legislator’s years of remaining electoral eligibility), and chamber-specific models, which classify respondents according to the term-limit status of the chamber at the time of response to our survey (that is, “none”; “adopted, but not yet implemented”; “effective, or implemented”; or “repealed”). In our earlier work, we were able to avoid choosing between these two approaches. We distinguished between “old-timers” (OT) and “newcomers” (NC) in both term-limit and non-term-limit states. OTs were defined as legislators who had first been elected prior to the introduction of term limits in their state (or up through 1992, in states without limits); NCs were those elected after the adoption of term limits in their state (or after 1992, for states without limits). This distinction left us with a fourfold classification of legislators, dubbed “Old- Timers, No Term Limits” (OTNTLs), “Newcomers, No Term Limits” (NCNTLs), “Old-Timers, Term Limits” (OTTLs), and “Newcomers, Term Limits” (NCTLs), according to the legislators’ relative status on a generational dimension and a term-limits dimension. This distinction also provided us with leverage in disentangling the effects of secular changes over time from the effects of term limits on state legislators.
That approach was legislator-specific insofar as it relied on a classification of survey respondents according to a characteristic of the individual (when each was first elected), but the model remained This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 110 John M. Carey et al. tractable because the legislator-specific classification was just one further dichotomy: whether or not the legislato adopted term limits. In 1995, the term-limits/no-term-limits was sufficient to categorize the term-limit status of legislativ because term limits had not actually kicked in anywhere limited chambers were alike in this sense, and the term-limit limits dichotomy was relatively sharp, so we could emplo specific models and still incorporate all the chamber-specific relevant at the time.5 By 2002, in contrast, chambers fell into four separate according to term-limit status: NTLs, which had never ad limits; AdoptedTLs, which had term limits on the books t kicked in; ImplementedTLs, in which term limits had ki removed some legislators; and PostTLs, in which term lim adopted but subsequently struck down.6 Each type of chamber (except for the NTLs) contained who varied with respect to individual-level characteristics, our respondents according to both chamber status and characteristics generated models that were statistically i given the modest numbers of cases in the many combin experimented with various such models, and the results i confidence that we have not overlooked effects of term limits that are constrained to narrow subsets of legislators.
In the end, we aimed for simplicity and interpretability, generally choosing between legislatorspecific and chamber-specific models. For cases in which we discerned noteworthy effects at both the chamber-specific and legislator-specific levels, we present the chamber-specific models and describe the additional legislator-specific effects. The type of model we rely on primarily depends on what sort of question we are asking. For analyzing effects of term limits on the composition of legislatures, legislator-specific models are appropriate. Classifying legislators according to when they were first elected allows us to account for trends over time that affect the prospects for various types of candidates (for example, minorities, women, and Christian fiindamentalists) across all states. Moreover, for modeling the choices of potential candidates about whether or not to run for office, it is theoretically appropriate to ignore much of the complexity with respect to the term-limit status of legislative chambers, and we retain a simple term-limits-on-the-books /no-term-limits dichotomy that can be incor- porated into the legislator-specific model. Beyond composition, however, we are interested in any impact of term limits on how legislatures operate. We can think about such effects This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Effects of Term Limits 1 1 1 a number of ways. They could be the downstream resul effects (different types of people are elected, differently). Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
They could be the product of environm operate on all legislators in a uniform fashion (that is, the incentives confronting any type of legislator, and s Or, the effects could be the product of environmental fa on legislators differently according to individual ch example, term limits change the incentives of legisla immediate termination more acutely than those still elig Legislator-specific models would be sensitive to first sort, but they are less well-suited to estimatin because they do not capture the specifics of the ter ment at the time the survey response is given. Chambe are sensitive to effects of the second sort. For exa interested in the power of committee chairs relative to actors, it is plausible that AdoptedTL chambers, wher on the books but have not yet removed long-tenured be different from ImplementedTL chambers, where the members have already been removed. Estimating the las requires a modeling strategy that measures both legi chamber-specific characteristics of respondents. What type of model is best at explaining term-lim empirical as well as a theoretical question. In cases specific, chamber-specific, or combined models wer plausible, we tried various approaches. By and large, legislator-specific results in our models estimating com chamber-specific results in models estimating institutio chamber-specific results – with legislator-specific qu relevant – in models estimating behavioral effects. Other Control Variables We are primarily interested in estimating the effects of term limits on various aspects of legislative representation, but many of the phenomena in which we are interested – what types of candidates win office, how they budget their time, their priorities and perceptions of the balance of power within state government – are clearly and powerfully affected by factors beyond term limits. Discussion:Administration & Interest Groups Ques
In order to isolate the independent effects of term limits, and to be confident in the mag- nitude of our estimates, we controlled for a range of factors widely regarded as affecting legislative representation in the states. Among these factors are demographics of each legislator’s district (partisan This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 02:36:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 12 John M. Carey et al. balance, percentage of various minority groups, indicators education levels, and so on), characteristics of the legislato majority party status, tenure in office, past margin of vic features of the legislator’s chamber (number of members, of districts, upper or lower house). Most consistently important among these controls was l professionalization. We created an index of professionalization t from 0 to 1 .0 according to the same method employed in ou work (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000, 145-49) but drawing current data about legislators’ compensation, legislative exp and days in session. Models The basic legislator-specific model we used for estimatin compositional effects is Pr(DV)= a(constant) + b^OTTL) + b2(NCNTL) + b3(NCTL) + b4 . . . bj(various controls, reported with models). Most of our models of compositional effects – and the only ones we report fully here – are logistic regressions because we focused on various dichotomous choices (gender; selected racial, ethnic, and religious affiliations) on which respondents categorized themselves. The omitted category is OTNTL (old-timers in non-term-limit states), who we regard as the baseline against which other legislators are evaluated. Thus the coefficient on each of the other categories indicates their difference relative to OTNTLs. The basic chamber-specific model we used for estima …
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